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Abstract
The appealing feature of quantum key distribution (QKD), from a cryptographic viewpoint, is the
ability to prove the information-theoretic security (ITS) of the established keys. As a key establish-
ment primitive, QKD however does not provide a standalone security service in its own: the secret
keys established by QKD are in general then used by a subsequent cryptographic applications for
which the requirements, the context of use and the security properties can vary. It is therefore
important, in the perspective of integrating QKD in security infrastructures, to analyze how QKD
can be combined with other cryptographic primitives.The purpose of this survey article, which
is mostly centered on European research results, is to contribute to such an analysis. We first re-
view and compare the properties of the existing key establishment techniques, QKD being one of
them. We then study more specifically two generic scenarios related to the practical use of QKD
in cryptographic infrastructures: 1) using QKD as a key renewal technique for a symmetric cipher
over a point-to-point link ; 2) using QKD in a network containing many users with the objective of
offering any-to-any key establishment service. We discuss the constraints as well as the potential
interest of using QKD in these contexts. We finally give an overview of challenges relative to the
development of QKD technology that also constitute potential avenues for cryptographic research.
✩This document is the fruit of a collaborative effort initiated within the FP6 Trust and Security European integrated
project SECOQC (IST-2002-506813). It is based for a large part on the SECOQC Crypto White Paper [1] that had been
released in 2007.
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1. Introduction
In recent years quantum cryptography has been the subject of strong activity and rapid progress
[2, 3, 4], and it is now extending its activity to pre-competitive research [5] and to commercial prod-
ucts [6]. Nevertheless, the fact that quantum key distribution (QKD) can play a useful role in prac-
tical cryptography is sometimes considered with skepticism [7, 8, 9, 10] and cannot therefore been
taken for granted. Analysing the practical cryptographic implications of QKD is indeed a complex
task that requires a combination of knowledge that usually belongs to separate academic commu-
nities, ranging from classical cryptography to the foundations of quantummechanics and network
security. Little work has so far been published on this issue, although [11] may be considered as a
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pioneering contribution on that matter. This review article tries to identify in which contexts QKD
can be useful, in addition to the scientifically well-established classical cryptographic primitives.
The logical construction in the next three sections of this paper paper is to analyze the use of
QKD, as a cryptographic primitive, for different purposes, reflecting the first three layers of the OSI
network model.
1. Secret key agreement (performed in the case of QKD at the physical layer).
2. Secure payload transmission built on top of a key agreement scheme (secure link layer cryp-
tographic primitive).
3. Secret key agreement over a global network composed of multiple users (network layer cryp-
tographic primitive).
The paper is thus organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide a survey of secret key agreement
techniques and discuss some of their strengths, weaknesses, and relative advantages. In Section 3,
we discuss the security and the performance of different secure payload transmission primitives
that can be built on top of QKD, and that can be used to secure point-to-point communication links.
In Section 4, we consider the use of QKD in a network context. We discuss previous works on QKD
networks and also describe the cryptographic operation of such networks and in particular their
initialization, that requires the distribution of pre-shared secrets. Finally, in Section 5 we widen the
scope of this survey paper by discussing some future research directions that could benefit from
active collaboration between the quantum and the classical cryptography communities: the study
of side-channels and of material security, the study of post-quantum-computing cryptography, the
use of QKD networks as a strong building block for new network security protocols and the de-
velopment of unified cryptographic standards and evaluation methods for quantum and classical
cryptography.
2. Secret key agreement
Cryptography has for a long time conformed to the idea that the techniques used to protect
sensitive data had themselves to be kept secret. Such principle, known as “cryptography by obscu-
rity” has however become inadequate in our modern era. The cryptography that has developed
as a science in the 1970s and 1980s [12] has allowed us to move away from this historical picture
and most of the modern cryptographic systems are now based on publicly announced algorithms
while their security lies in the use of secret keys.
Distributing keys among a set of legitimate users while guaranteeing the secrecy of these keys
with respect to any potential opponent is thus a central issue in cryptography, known as the secret
key agreement problem.
There are currently five families of cryptographic methods that can be used to solve the secret
key agreement problem between distant users:
1. Classical ITS schemes
2. Classical computationally secure public-key cryptography
3. Classical computationally secure symmetric-key cryptographic schemes
4. Quantum key distribution
5. Trusted couriers
We will present how each of these cryptographic families can provide solutions to the key agree-
ment problem and discuss, in each case, the type of security that can be provided. We will also
consider a sixth type of secret key agreement schemes: hybrid schemes built by combining some
of the methods listed above.
2.1. Classical information-theoretically secure key agreement schemes
A cryptosystem is information-theoretically secure (ITS) if its security derives purely from infor-
mation theory. That is, it makes no unproven assumptions on the hardness of some mathematical
problems, and is hence secure even when the adversary has unbounded computing power. The ex-
pression “unconditional security” is a synonym of “information-theoretical security” and is more
widely used in the cryptographic literature.
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2.2 Classical public-key cryptography and secret key agreement
Studying the question of classical ITS secret key agreement (CITSKA) requires us to go back
to the foundations of information-theoretic security, which builds on Shannon’s notion of perfect
secrecy [13]. In seminal papers, Wyner [14] and later Csiszàr and Körner [15] proved that there
exist channel codes guaranteeing both robustness to transmission errors and an arbitrarily small
degree of information leakage towards non-authorized parties eavesdropping on the communica-
tions performed on the channel. CITSKA is possible in the wire-tap configuration, as long as the
legitimate users have access to a common source of randomness through classical channels that
are less noisy than the channel the eavesdropper has access to [15]. The results obtained by Csiszàr
and Körner generalize the framework in which CITSKA is possible: they show that whenever two
parties have in their possession correlated strings of classical data that exhibit more correlation
between them than with any string that could be in the possession of an eavesdropper, then ITS
secret key agreement is possible. As we shall see in 2.4, the use of a quantum channel and of an
appropriate protocol is a practical solution in order to obtain such correlated strings of classical
data.
There are however also secret key agreement schemes that can exploit the ideas developed in
[15] and that can be implemented within the framework of classical information theory. Such CIT-
SKA schemes however need to rely on some specific extra assumptions, limiting the power of the
eavesdropper in order to be ITS. Christian Cachin and Ueli Maurer [16] demonstrated that CITSKA
is possible in the bounded-storage model, in which the adversaries can only store a limited amount
of data. Introducing the idea of advantage distillation, Maurer later generalized the previous mod-
els and showed that CITSKA is possible over a wide class of classical channels [17].
2.2. Classical public-key cryptography and secret key agreement
Public-key cryptography foundations rest on the difficulty of solving some mathematical prob-
lems for which no efficient algorithms are known. The computing resources needed to solve these
problems become totally unachievable when long enough keys are used. Public-key cryptographic
systems thus rely on what is called “provable computational security”. Public-key cryptography
is however not unconditionally secure: there is no proof that the problems on which it is based are
intractable or even that that their complexity is not polynomial.
Public-key algorithms for encryption require two keys: a public and a private key, which form
a key pair. Algorithms are designed in such a way that anyone can encrypt a message using the
public key, while only the legitimate recipient, in possession of the private key, can decrypt the
message. Because of the asymmetry between the two users of a public-key cryptosystem (one
holding the private key, and keeping it secret, while the other user only needs to know a public,
non-secret key, and worry about its authenticity), public-key cryptography is often referred to as
asymmetric cryptography.
Secret key agreement based on public-key cryptography. As shown byWhitfield Diffie andMartin Hell-
man in 1976 [18], public-key cryptography can be used to establish a shared secret key over an
unprotected classical communication channel, without using a prior shared secret. It thus pro-
vides a practical way to implement secret key agreement, in particular over open networks. Note
however that Diffie-Hellman does not guarantee the authenticity of key agreement and thus that an
additional authentication scheme needs to be provided. Over open networks such as the Internet,
public-key infrastructures, i.e. trusted third parties, are often used for this purpose.
Security of public-key cryptography . Public-key classical encryption schemes currently in use are
based on well-studied mathematical problems that are believed to be computationally difficult to
solve, such as the computation of discrete logarithms over finite fields or elliptic curves or the
factorization of integers in the case of the RSA scheme.
In the case of RSA, it is necessary to use private and public keys of at least 1024 bits, in or-
der to offer a reasonable security margin against the computational efforts of an eavesdropper
and asymmetric keys of 2048 bits are preferable [19, 20]. However, since the computational hard-
ness of the underlying problems in public-key cryptography have not been formally established,
public-key cryptography is not immune to scenarios where an eavesdropper would possess some
unexpectedly strong computational power or would know better cryptanalysis techniques than
the best published ones. Moreover, most of the currently used public-key cryptographic schemes
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(for example RSA) could be cracked in polynomial time with a quantum computer: this results
from Shor’s algorithm for discrete log and factoring, that has a complexity of O(n3) [21]. It how-
ever seems possible to build alternative public-key cryptographic schemes on problems that could
resist polynomial cryptanalysis on a quantum computer, such as lattice shortest vector problem
[22, 23]. Such schemes are nevertheless much less practical than RSA-like schemes. This topic is at
themoment actively studied, in the framework of what is called post-quantum computing cryptog-
raphy [25], and we will discuss some implications of what researchers already know in subsection
5.4.
Speed of public-key cryptography. Making the computations relative to the asymmetric cryptographic
protocols requiring long keys, such as RSA, is a rather computational intensive and time-consuming
task. The performance of RSA-based key agreement implementations depends heavily on hard-
ware : for RSA 2048 implemented on an Intel Pentium IV with a 2.93 GHz processor, the com-
putations needed for one key exchange (essentially one RSA encryption and one decryption) take
roughly 10 ms [26]. The same key exchange would be approximately ten times faster (thus in the
ms range) on dedicated coprocessors and is ten times slower (in the time range of a few tens of a
second) on smart card coprocessors [27]. There are other public-key encryption protocols, for ex-
ample based on elliptic curves, for which keys are significantly shorter (typically between 160 and
256 bits), but only slightly better speed performance can be obtained. As a consequence public-
key cryptography is too slow to be used in order to encrypt communications over data networks.
Public-key cryptography is most commonly used solely for initial secret session key agreement (in
network protocols like SSL for example), while faster classical symmetric-key cryptography is then
generally used for symmetric encryption and/or authentication of data.
2.3. Classical computationally secure symmetric-key cryptography and secret key agreement
Symmetric-key cryptography refers to cryptography methods in which both the sender and
receiver share the same secret key. Symmetric-key encryption was the only kind of encryption
publicly known until the discovery of public-key cryptography in 1976 [18].
Symmetric-key ciphers are used to guarantee the secrecy of the encrypted messages. Modern
study of symmetric-key ciphers relates mainly to the study of block ciphers and stream ciphers
and to their applications. AES is a block cipher that had been designed by a team of Belgium
cryptographers (Joan Daemen et Vincent Rijmen) and has been adopted as an encryption standard
by the US government (in replacement of DES). Block ciphers can be used to compute Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) and can thus also be used to guarantee integrity and authenticity
of messages. Stream ciphers, in contrast to block ciphers, create an arbitrarily long stream of key
material, which is combined with the plaintext bit-by-bit or character-by-character, somewhat like
the one-time-pad. We will however restrict our discussion to block ciphers in the remaining part of
this sub-section, reference [28] provides a very complete survey of classical computationally secure
symmetric-key schemes.
Secret key agreement based on classical computationally secure symmetric-key cryptography . Secret key
agreement can be realized by using solely symmetric-key cryptographic primitives. For exam-
ple, the combination of a symmetric-key encryption scheme with a symmetric-key authentication
scheme allows one to build a secret key agreement primitive. Provided that an initial small secret
key is previously shared, symmetrically, by Alice and Bob, they can use a symmetric cipher to
encrypt messages. These messages (that can consist of random bit strings or not) will constitute
the next keys that can be shared securely between Alice and Bob. The initially shared symmetric
key material can be used to symmetrically compute (on Alice’s side) and check (on Bob’s side) a
message authentication tag, and thus guarantee the authenticity of the newly distributed secret
keys. As we shall see, O(logn) bits of secret keys are sufficient to authenticate n bits of messages
in this context. It is thus only necessary to pre-share a small initial quantity of secret keys, used for
authentication to perform secret key agreement with symmetric primitives, therefore, only small
initial secret keys are needed. One has to call such secret key agreement schemes secret key expansion
schemes more than secret key establishment schemes.
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Security of classical computationally secure symmetric-key-based secret key agreement.. The security of
secret key agreement based on classical symmetric-key cryptography depends on the security of
the cryptographic primitives that are used, and on the composability of those cryptographic prim-
itives. Shannon has proven that there is no unconditionally secure encryption scheme which re-
quires less encryption key bits than the one-time-pad [13]. This has a fundamental implication:
the entropy of the encryption key needs to be at least as large as the entropy of the message to
be encrypted if one wants to build an unconditionally secure scheme. Hence, if we consider the
possibility of building an unconditionally secure symmetric key expansion scheme, i.e. a method
to symmetrically generate secret keys out of a short initial symmetric shared secret key, the former
results from Shannon imply that such a scheme is impossible to achieve in the framework of clas-
sical cryptography. However, as we shall see in subsection 2.4, such a cryptographic primitive is
possible in a quantum cryptographic context.
It is however possible to use classical symmetric-key encryption and authentication schemes,
that are not unconditionally secure, to build a secret key agreement scheme. AES can for example
be used for symmetric-key encryption and can be also used to compute message authentication
codes (using, for instance, CBC-MAC). The security model that applies to such symmetric-key
classical encryption schemes (symmetric-key block ciphers and stream ciphers) is not uncondi-
tional security (the entropy of the key is smaller than the entropy of the message) and not even
“provably computationally security”. The security model that applies to classical symmetric-key
cryptography can be called “practical computational security”: a cryptographic scheme is con-
sidered “practically computationally secure” if the best-known attacks require too much resource
(such as computation power, time, memory) by an acceptable margin [28, 20].
There are no publicly known quantum attacks on classical symmetric-key cryptographic schemes
and the cryptanalysis of symmetric-key classical cryptography on a quantum computer reduces to
exhaustive search. Here a quantum computer would thus still give an advantage: performing ex-
haustive key search given a known plaintext-ciphertext pair corresponds to the problem of finding
a element in a unsorted database of N elements. The complexity of this problem is of O(N) on
a classical computer but only of O(
√
N) on a quantum computer [29]. The complexity reduction
offered by Grover algorithm is only polynomial (as opposed to the super-polynomial complexity
reduction offered by Shor algorithm), and this implies that doubling the key size would be enough
to maintain (against quantum computers) the level of algorithmic complexity one currently has
today against classical computers for symmetric-key primitives.
Performances. Symmetric-key classical cryptography is by several orders of magnitude less compu-
tational intensive and thus leads to faster implementations compared to asymmetric cryptography
[30]. There are now 128-bit AES encryptors able to encrypt data at rates in the Gbit/s range [31].
This is the reason why it is widely preferred to use symmetric-key schemes for encryption and/or
authentication over currently deployed communication networks. AES is currently the chosen
standard for symmetric-key classical block ciphers.
Under the assumption that there exists no better way to break a symmetric-key cryptographic
scheme is exhaustive search within the key space (assumption that will be discussed in more de-
tails in subsection 3.3) then, a symmetric key of 103 bits is roughly comparable, in terms of com-
putational requirements, to a RSA key modulus of 2048 bits. Note that doubling the length of a
symmetric key implies squaring the computational efforts needed for exhaustive search; on the
other hand, the computational efforts do not scale as fast with key length in the case of asymmetric
cryptography [20].
2.4. Quantum key agreement - quantum key distribution (QKD)
Unconditionally secure key agreement relying on quantum physics. Quantum key distribution, invented
in 1984 by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard [32] based on some earlier ideas of StephenWiesner
[33] is a quantum cryptographic alternative solution to the secret key agreement problem, between
two users that trust each other, in the presence of an adversary. In contrast to public-key cryptog-
raphy, it has been proven to be unconditionally secure, i.e. secure irrespectively of the computing
power that may be used by an attacker [35, 34, 36].
An important consequence of the unconditional security of QKD is that it would remain se-
cure even in the advent of a quantum computer. On the other hand, legitimate users can perform
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unconditionally secure QKD even without possessing themselves a quantum computer. QKD can
thus be deployed today in order to secure communication networks.
Rigorously speaking, quantum key distribution should be called quantum key agreement, or
quantum key establishment, since the secret key shared at the end of the protocol is not decided
upon solely by one of the player and then distributed to the other. However, as the expression
“quantum key distribution” and the acronym QKD are now firmly established, we have chosen to
stick to them throughout this article.
The existing work on (classical) secret key agreement by public discussion, studied in the frame-
work of information-theoretic cryptography [17], has played an important role in QKD security
proofs and it is interesting to see that QKD has conversely also triggered some important develop-
ment in classical information-theoretic cryptography [37]. However, classical models are in gen-
eral not sufficient to capture all the information that can be learnt by a quantum eavesdropper, and
QKD security proofs must rely on elements of quantum information theory.
It is indeed possible to relate QKD security to the fact that it is impossible to gain information
about non-orthogonal quantum states without perturbing these states [38, 39, 40]. This property
is used to upper bound the amount of information that can have been gained by an eavesdropper,
commonly called Eve, tampering on the quantum channel connecting the two legitimate users,
commonly called Alice and Bob. If the information bound on the eavesdropper is low enough, a
key can be distilled between Alice and Bob, and this with perfect secrecy: the information Eve may
have about the key is, with an exponentially high probability, below a vanishingly small upper
bound.
In addition to the first general proofs mentioned above, the theory of QKD security has contin-
ued to evolve, with recent proof techniques that now refer to a security criteria that is composably
secure [41] and based on information measures (smooth min- and max-entropies, that are gener-
alization of the Shannon entropy) that give an operational framework to analyze the security of
quantum (as well as classical) information-theoretic cryptography. This framework also allows to
carry out the security analysis with a finite number of signals [42], as it was also the case in the
earlier works of Mayers [35] and Biham et. al. [34].
Basic principles of QKD. Without going into the details of the different implementations or protocols
(one can refer to Refs [2, 3, 4] for an extensive overview on thatmatter) we can describe the structure
and the principle of operation of the basic practical QKD system: a QKD link.
QKD Device QKD Device
Quantum Channel
Classical Channel
Alice Bob
Eve
QKD Link
Figure 1: Structure of a QKD link as it is referred throughout this article
As depicted on Fig. 1, a QKD link is a point-to-point connection between two users, Alice and
Bob, who want to share secret keys. The QKD link is constituted by the combination of a quantum
channel and a classical channel. Alice generates a random stream of classical bits and encodes them
into a sequence of non-orthogonal quantum states of light, sent over the quantum channel. Upon
reception of those quantum states, Bob performs appropriate measurements leading him to share
some classical data correlated with Alice’s bit stream. The classical channel is then used to test
these correlations. If the correlations are high enough, this statistically implies that no significant
eavesdropping has taken place on the quantum channel and thus that with very high probability,
a perfectly secure symmetric key can be distilled from the correlated data shared by Alice and Bob.
In the opposite case, the key generation process has to be aborted and started again. This means
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in particular that any strong enough perturbation on the quantum channel, inducing noise above
the security threshold (this threshold is for example of 11% for the BB84 protocol with one-way
classical communications [32, 4]), will in practice disrupt the key generation. An active attacker
accessing the quantum channel can thus in practice mount denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and we
will discuss in 4.2.3 how such attacks can be mitigated in a network context.
Authentication of the classical channel and everlasting security. QKD is a symmetric secret key agree-
ment technique that requires, as initial resources, a public quantum channel and an authenticated
public classical channel. If one wants to stay in the strongest security model i.e. the ITS paradigm,
for the authentication of the communications on the classical channel, message authentication
codes based on universal hashing can be used. Such authentication codes were first introduced by
Wegman and Carter and further developed, especially by Stinson [44, 45, 46]. In order to use ITS
authentication in QKD, Alice and Bob need to share, in advance, a short secret key (whose length
can scale almost logarithmically with the length of the secret key generated by a QKD session, for
a given security parameter [46]). QKD, operated in this regime, is an ITS symmetric secret key
expansion scheme that has no classical counterpart since secrecy entropy cannot be increased by
classical means [47]. Moreover, after initialization of the system (initial distribution of small secret
authentication keys), authentication is not a burden for the global performance of QKD systems.
As discussed in [11, 48] and also in sections 3 and 4, there are differentways to obtain an authen-
ticated public channel, and non-ITS authentication primitives such as public-key authentication
can be combined with QKD. In this case, the resulting QKD protocol is not strictly speaking un-
conditionally secure, but still verifies a very powerful security property called everlasting security:
although the QKD-based key establishment now relies on some computational assumptions, this
potential weakness (against an adversary computationally very powerful) can only be exploited
during the QKD protocol execution. If the authentication mechanism is broken at any later point in
time, it will not alter the security of the generated key. One can thus use QKD to build long-term
unconditional secrets out of short-term secrets, hence the term everlasting security.
Security assumptions in QKD. Even though “unconditional security”, synonym of information-
theoretically, is a proper term to characterize the security of QKD, one must be careful with the
precise meaning of this expression. As noted in [2], there are indeed several important underlying
assumptions that must be fulfilled for QKD security proofs to be valid and the term “uncondi-
tional” can in a sense be misleading. Let us list three important assumptions:
• [Quantum Mechanics] The security of QKD is intrinsically based on the assumption that
Quantum Mechanics is correct. One important property is for example that non-orthogonal
quantum states, onto which information is encoded in QKD, cannot be distinguished per-
fectly. This leads to a fundamental trade-off between the information that an eavesdropper
can learn and the disturbance that it creates, which is exploited in security proofs.
• [Secure labs] There is no leakage of information from the honest parties labs of Alice and Bob.
As a matter of fact, all the information about the secret key is processed in the labs of Alice
and Bob and no key secrecy is achievable if this information leaks. This assumption may
not be easy to enforce in practice. There are however technical and organizational measures
(commonly used in security) that can help to back up this assumption: Alice and Bob QKD
hardware can be put in tamper-resistant cases and / or stored in secure locations, with access
control measures making it unaccessible to Eve.
• [Trustworthy implementation] The implementation of Alice and BobQKD devices is conform
to what they expect it to be and to the modeling made in the security proof. This “double
trust assumption” is directly challenged by the demonstration of successful attacks [49, 50] on
QKD implementations, as it will be discussed in 5.1. As a consequence, backing up this trust
assumption onQKD implementation will imply to develop and implement counter-measures
to known attacks and certification procedures for QKD devices in the same spirit as what
exists today for (classical) cryptographic hardware. Another way to deal with this security
assumption on QKD implementation might indeed be to go around it. This is the idea behind
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the so-called “device-independent QKD protocols” for which unconditional security can be
proven independently of the hardware implementation of Alice and Bob QKD devices.
The three generic security assumptions mentioned above are sufficient to set up the frame-
work in which QKD security can be formally proven. As we shall see in 5.1, the last two
assumptions can be challenged in the context of side-channel attacks, while on the other
hand, the “Trustworthy implementation” assumption can be relaxed in the context of device-
independent QKD. This last assumption, related to the trust in QKD hardware is fairly broad
and must be made in principle for all the pieces of equipment inside a QKD device: laser
source, phase/amplitude modulator, detectors, electronics, etc. There are nonetheless equip-
ments that have a special status from a cryptographic point of view, namely random number
generators (RNGs). RNGs are needed in most QKD implementations (this is not the case for
QKD systems based on sources of entangled photon pairs) as local sources of presumably
perfect entropy, i.e. totally unpredictable for an external observer. Most RNGs used today
in computers and industrial products are pseudo-RNGs (PRNGs) that generate sequences of
numbers that approximate the properties of random numbers but can be determined based
on the knowledge of a small number of parameters. The use of PRNGs as entropy source is
thus not possible in QKD, for it would contradict its information-theoretic security claims. On
the other hand, there exist RNGs called true random number generators (TRNGs) where the
entropy generated is based on physical processes. Randomness generation can for example
rely on thermal noise in electric circuits (resistor, ring oscillator) is very hard to predict unless
strong bias can be imposed on the noise process. One might also design “quantum random
number generators” (QRNGs) that are special TRNGs where the randomness is due to the
unpredictable nature of the outcome of quantum measurements. Several quantum processes
can be exploited to build a QRNG (nuclear decay, shot noise, reflexions of single photons on
a semi-transparent mirror, etc.) and several QRNGs are now commercialized [51, 52] In order
to perform QKD in a information-theoretic setting, TRNGs or QRNGs should be used and
incorporated in QKD implementations.
2.5. Trusted couriers key distribution (TCKD)
The trusted courier method is known since the ancient times: a trusted courier travels between
the different legitimate users to distribute secret keys, hopefully without being intercepted or cor-
rupted on his way by any potential opponent. Only practical security can be invoked in this case,
which has to be backed by the enforcement of an appropriate set of security measures. Although
trusted couriers become costly and unpractical when implemented on large systems, this technique
has remained in use in some highly-sensitive environments such as government intelligence, or de-
fense.
The trusted couriers key distribution (TCKD) is probably one of the methods used in the frame-
work of network security for which the analogy with QKD is the closest:
• Like QKD, TCKD is a method relying on the physical security of the communication line
between Alice and Bob, it is thus also sensitive to distance and other characteristics (danger,
perturbations ...) of the communication line between Alice and Bob.
• Like QKD, TCKD can be used as a secret key agreement protocol.
• Like QKD, TCKD needs some initial trust in the relative identities of Alice and Bob. More-
over, like for QKD, this necessary initial trusted authentication can be handled via different
techniques, such as the pre-distribution of a secret key (such as a password), or the use of an
unforgeable (or at least reputed to be such) public identity certificate issued by a trusted third
party (such as as the seal that was used by emperors and kings or the signed certificates we
now use for public keys).
• Like QKD, TCKD is a technique that currently finds its application when classical secret key
agreement schemes are believed not to offer enough security guarantees.
Despite the similarities listed above, there are important differences between QKD and TCKD:
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• The first difference is really intrinsic to QKD and TCKD “physical realities”. In the case of
QKD, the “couriers” are quantum states of lights (flying qubits) traveling at the speed of light
and on which eavesdropping can be detected with arbitrary high statistical certainty. On the
other hand, TCKD cannot offer any of those guarantees and, whether one uses human beings
or pigeons, trust or corruption of a classical courier cannot be proven nor tested.
• Reliability, automation and cost effectiveness will, very likely, be one of the major advances
offered by the development of QKD networks, that can moreover efficiently handle key man-
agement issues. On the other hand, reliability and cost of TCKD infrastructures are critical
problems and there is no real hope that such systems can ever be automated, leading to seri-
ous key management issues and very high operational costs.
• Unlike point-to-point QKD links, classical trusted couriers are not intrinsically limited in dis-
tance. They are also not very limited in rate since they can take advantage of the possibilities
offered by today’s portable and versatile classical memories, such as DVDs or USB keys, that
can store Gigabytes of data. We will however see in section 4 that QKD networks could be
used to go beyond QKD links distance limitations and that such networks could also be used
to distribute secret keys “on demand” to the end users, which is fundamentally different from
relying on keys stored on the very same DVD, that could be duplicated at any later point in
time if some adversary manages to break the protections around the storage device.
2.6. Cascaded schemes and dual key agreement
Cascaded ciphers. The idea of cascaded cipher is to compose several encryption primitives by apply-
ing them sequentially on the same cleartext. Note that the encryption primitives can be of different
types as in AES-Twofish or the same one as in 3DES. The interest of cascading ciphers is to increase
cryptanalysis’ difficulty. As pointed out by Maurer and Massey, [53], the first encryption layer, i.e.
the one directly applied to the message, is in all cases the most important one.
Dual secret key agreement. This idea of cascaded cipher can straightforwardly be applied to secret
key agreement: two keys of the same length are established through two secret key agreement
schemes (relying on either the same primitive or on different ones) and the final key is obtained by
XORing these two keys. We will talk, in this context, of dual secret key agreement. Note that more
than two secret key agreement schemes, of various types, can in principle be combined this way.
We will restrict in the following to a discussion of dual secret key agreement involving QKD as one
of the secret key agreement technique.
The approach of dual secret key agreement could for example be beneficial when combining
keys established through one classical key agreement scheme (RSA for example) and keys estab-
lished through QKD: breaking the entire secret key agreement scheme implies breaking the clas-
sical key agreement scheme and breaking QKD. If one has doubts about the security of QKD, the
dual secret key agreement procedure guarantees that the security will at least not be worse than
that of the classical secret key agreement technique with which it is combined. The same is true if
one has doubts about the security of secret key agreement scheme based on classical cryptography.
However, while there already exist security standards in classical cryptography (for example FIPS
140 [54] or Common Criteria [55]), there are not yet such standards for QKD. The approach of dual
secret key agreement could thus allow to certify a system according to already established criteria,
without requiring to specify the quantum part of the key establishment. On the other hand, as we
shall see in subsection 5.3, the certification of quantum cryptosystems is a topic on which work
is already being initiated and we can hope to have FIPS-140 or Common Criteria certified QKD
systems within a few years.
3. Securing a point-to-point classical communication link by combining QKD with symmetric
encryption
QKD is a secret key agreement primitive that can be performed at the physical layer level. In
previous section, we have compared QKD to other existing solutions for secret key agreement.
We will now analyze how the secret keys established by QKD can be used to perform a link layer
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cryptographic task: securing the data sent on a classical communication link, by relying on keys
generated by QKD (plus some initially shared small secret authentication keys) and on symmetric-
key cryptographic primitives.
More formally, we consider here the problem of securely transmitting classical messages (pay-
load) from Alice to Bob via the following generic protocol:
1. Establishment of a symmetric secret key KS = Kencrypt ·Kauth between Alice and Bob (X · Y
stands for the concatenation of string X with string Y ).
2. Secure and authentic transmission of themessageM over the classical channel, with symmetric-
key cryptographic primitives: M is encrypted with encryption keyKencrypt and authenticated
with the authentication keyKauth.
After a brief subsection about the performances of QKD devices we will analyze several vari-
ations of the generic scenario described above, in which QKD is used as the secret key agreement
primitive over a point-to-point link, while different types of encryption and authentication schemes
are used.
3.1. Performance of QKD link devices: recent progresses
QKD research and development is carried out on an international level [56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61]
and QKD systems are being developed with increasing performances and reliability. One can cur-
rently expect to exchange up to 1 Mbits of secret key per second, over a point-to-point QKD link
of 20 km [62]. The maximum span of QKD links is now roughly around 100 km or even 140 km
[62, 63] (depending on the type of single photon detector that is used) at 1550 nm on a telecom dark
fiber. A comparable maximum span has also been reached in the context of ground-to-ground free
space QKD [64]. This experiment was successfully realized with a quantum channel whose losses
were one order of magnitude larger than what we expect them to be in the framework of space-
to-ground communications. It thus paves the way towards QKD between a satellite and a ground
station [57]. Both secret bit rate and maximum reachable distance are expected to continue their
progression during the next years due to combined theoretical and experimental advances. Note
that in any case QKD performances are intrinsically upper bounded by the performance of clas-
sical optical communications. It is however also important to notice that QKD systems can now
basically be built with optimized, off-the-shelves telecom components (laser, phase modulators,
beamsplitters, polarization controllers, and etc.) at the notable exception of photodetectors. Pho-
todetection is currently the bottleneck for the performance of QKD systems, but it is important to
keep in mind that, even on that side, although there are many technical problems to overcome,
there are very few fundamental limitations for rate and distance, as detection methods are making
significant progresses [65, 66, 58, 62, 63, 60]. Another approach, known as “continuous variables
QKD” (CVQKD) uses only standard PIN photodiodes, but requires more sophisticated data post-
processing in order to extract the secret keys [67]. Significant progresses, on the theoretical [68] as
well on the implementation side [69] have been achieved for CVQKD and further advances on the
protocol side may allow CVQKD systems, that were known to be able to deliver high bit-rate but
only for small or medium losses on the quantum channel, to become suitable for long-distance,
high-bit rate QKD [70].
As optical modulation and detection techniques become faster and faster (currently reaching
GHz clock rates for discrete variable systems [66]), data post-processing, and in particular error
correction, may become the bottleneck in terms of reachable key rate. As a consequence, serious
efforts are invested to design fast and efficient implementations of error correcting codes adapted
to the specificities of QKD. An initial protocol was introduced by Brassard and Salvail [71] in 1993:
Cascade, and remainswidely used. Practical error correction technique like Cascade (whose decod-
ing complexity is in n log(n)) or LDPC decoding (also in n log(n)) are both capacity achieving and
efficiently decodable. LDPC are however more and more used in practical QKD, both for continu-
ous [72] and discrete variable QKD [73], because of performance concerns (Cascade is interactive
and can require a lot of network bandwidth) and also because the requirement of one-way classi-
cal communication (and therefore unidirectional reconciliation) is often a necessary hypothesis in
existing security proofs.
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3.2. QKD composed with one-time-pad: long-term security of link encryption
One-time-pad encryption is the only encryption scheme for which information-theoretic secu-
rity can be proven. It is thus natural to combine it with QKD. Beyond the fact that it is ITS, QKD
has the important property of being universally composable (UC) [74]. Universal composability of
QKD can be proven [41] and implies that QKD can be composed with other ITS and UC protocols,
resulting in a composed protocol that is also ITS and UC. As a consequence, when keys established
by QKD are used to perform one-time-pad encryption the resulting protocol is an unconditionally
secure message transmission protocol [75]. Building an unconditionally secure classical communi-
cation link is probably one of the most important application of QKD.
Taking advantage of the perfect secrecy offered by one-time-pad and from the fact that the keys
established by QKD are unconditionally secure, message encryption can be performed with a level
of security that cannot be reached when the key agreement mechanism is not QKD: the messages
are perfectly secret with respect to adversaries and there is provably absolutely no chance that
future events could alter the secrecy of these messages.
As pointed out in [48], long-term security is needed in many specific application scenarios, such
as the protection of medical records, industrial secrets and military or governmental classified in-
formations. However, offering long-term security for highly sensitive data is not something that
can be guaranteed by today’s computationally secure schemes. Indeed, as written in [20], “beyond
approximately 10 years into the future, the general feeling among ECRYPT partners is that recom-
mendations made today should be assigned a rather small confidence level, perhaps in particular
for asymmetric primitives”. As a matter of fact, it is important to note that when one deals with
the transmission of encrypted information, an adversary can always store the ciphertext and wait
for the decryption until better cryptanalysis methods become available (for example more efficient
algorithms for factoring or the discovery of an efficient way to attack AES) or better cryptanaly-
sis hardware (indeed large quantum computers would be very efficient for breaking most of the
asymmetric encryption primitives in use today). The recommendation of ECRYPT is indeed to
consider using one-time-pad encryption for high-security levels, “provided the key management
can be solved” [20]. In this perspective, the combination of QKD with one-time-pad, which pro-
vides a practical solution for unconditionnally-secure data transmission over a point-to-point link
(solution that can indeed be extended in the context of networks, see section 4) seems to be a natu-
ral response to meet some of the most stringent requirements within high-security communication
infrastructures: long-term security.
3.3. QKD composed with a classical computationally secure symmetric encryption scheme: key security and
key ageing
Here we will consider one very frequent use case: QKD combined with link encryption per-
formed with a symmetric encryption scheme (such as AES). This combination is the one that is
currently pushed forward by existing commercial QKD vendors [6]. It provides a practical solu-
tion adopted within the BBN Darpa Quantum Network project [76]. Such a composition provides
a practical solution to realise a point-to-point VPN encryptor, that can be deployed in layer 2 (link)
in the OSI network layer model [6] or directly in the layer 3 (network), for example by interfacing
QKD-based key exchange with IPSEC [77, 78].
The final security of the exchanged data over such link cannot be stronger than the security of
the encryption scheme. In the case of a symmetric-key block cipher, the security of the encrypted
data depends on at least four factors:
1. the security of the encryption key (can an opponent get even some partial information about
the key?);
2. the number of blocks that have been encrypted with the same key (key renewal rate);
3. the length of the encryption key (56 bits for DES, 128, 192 or 256 bits for AES);
4. the security of the symmetric-key encryption algorithm, for which only “practical computa-
tional security” can be claimed.
The last two factors are only dependent on the encryption technique and not at all on the key
agreement scheme. The security implications (and the security level) associated with the choice of
a given symmetric cipher, with a given key modulus length is discussed in detail in [28, 19, 20]. In
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the ECRYPT Yearly Report on Algorithms and Keysizes published in july 2008 [20], a symmetric
key modulus of 128 bits is recommended for long-term security (while 256 bits is recommended
for a good protection of symmetric ciphers against a quantum computer).
The first two factors, on the other hand, are influenced by the choice of the secret key agree-
ment scheme: the security of the key is intrinsically linked to the security of the secret key agree-
ment scheme while the key renewal rate also strongly depends, on a practical level (hardware
performance, security policy, implementation details, etc.), on the key establishment scheme. We
will discuss in the following whether QKD-based schemes, used in replacement of traditional key
agreement schemes, present an interest with respect to these two factors.
3.3.1. Security of the key
As explained in section 2, there exist many different solutions to perform secret key agreement,
but QKD is the only existing and practically implementable scheme that can offer information-
theoretic security. One advantage of using QKD as the key renewal mechanism for link encryption
is the long-term security guarantee for the keys. This is to be compared with the usual mode of
operation for VPN encryptors, where the establishment of an encryption key relies on asymmetric
cryptography and thus imply a vulnerability to potentially existing (now or in the future) compu-
tational attacks on the public-key scheme.
Another important operational interest of QKD, when used sequentially to produce successive
encryption keys, is the property called forward-secrecy of the established keys: the successive keys
established over a QKD link are independent from one another. Therefore the potential compro-
mise of a single key cannot lead to the compromise of other keys. We can notice that the forward-
secrecy of QKD is a natural consequence (and weaker property) than the everlasting secrecy men-
tioned in 2.4. As a matter of fact, in the sequential production of QKD keys, the secret mate-
rial needed at each QKD round to authenticate the classical channel stems from a previous QKD
round. Forward-secrecy in key establishment is an important property and can also be obtained
with public-key cryptography under computational assumptions [79] while it cannot be obtained
at all with computational symmetric cryptography since the successive keys are not independent
from one another.
3.3.2. Key renewal rate
The rate at which encryption keys are renewed can influence the security of the encrypted data.
This is what we call the key ageing factor, that can be reformulated as a question: how often secret
session keys should be changed and what is the impact on the global security of the classical mes-
sage passing scheme? To give elements of answer to this question, we will consider the practical
example of a link encryptor that corresponds to what current QKD vendors are selling: combining
QKD-based secret key agreement with AES.
• A practical example: key renewal for AES encryption
Let’s take the case of 128-bit AES for which Xilinx produces dedicated cipher modules that can
support a data rate of 2.2 Gbit/s and for which “dedicated research hardware” has demonstrated
a rate of 21.54 Gbit/s [31]. In this case, the number of blocks (of 128 bits) encrypted per second
(with a 128-bit key) is 108.23 ≃ 227 blocks/s. An exhaustive key search attack would in this case
take 2101 seconds, i.e. roughly 8 1022 years, way beyond the age of the universe (≃ 13 109 years),
which means that exhaustive search attacks are not a threat to AES.
We must however not forget that the previous calculation is done under the assumption that
exhaustive search is the best attack on AES. It seems thus important to question this assumption
and study what can be said about the influence of the encryption key renewal rate on the security
of AES. This complex question is intrinsically linked to the security assumptions one can make on
AES itself.
• Security of AES
The cryptanalysis of encryption schemes like AES is a difficult topic that is still subject to very
active research and it seems realistic to think that the ultimate difficulty of such cryptanalysis is
currently not known.
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For block ciphers, the resistance to cryptanalysis depends in particular on the number of rounds
applied when encrypting one block (see [28] for details). Even though AES is considered secure
and is currently a standard (in the USA for example, AES-128 is considered sufficient up to the
SECRET security level, while AES-192 or AES-256 can be used for TOP SECRET communications
[80]) it had been shown that weaker versions of AES, with reduced numbers of rounds, could be
attacked successfully by strategies that require less computational efforts than exhaustive search
[28]. Some cryptographers also claimed that powerful algebraic attacks could break AES based
only on a very small number of known cleartext / ciphertext [81]. However, algebraic attacks have
never been successfully demonstrated on AES and are not regarded as a real threat by the majority
of the cryptography community [20].
Very recently in 2011, the first cryptographic break on the full version of AES has been pub-
lished [82]. This attack allows key recovery from AES-128 in 2126.1. Hence this result does not
make mathematical attacks on AES really more practical than exhaustive search. It is however an
incentive to renew AES encryption key relatively often, as we shall discuss in the next paragraph.
• Key renewal rate and use of QKD
If AES is considered perfectly secure, then the limit of 2keylength blocks after which the keys
have to be renewed in order to avoid collision-related problems is in practice not a problem, and
one cannot justify the need to renew the AES keys several times per second as QKD can allow.
However, as we have seen in the previous paragraphs, there exist arguments, based on some
known existing algorithmic weaknesses of reduced versions of AES, that indicate that it could be
beneficial for the global security of AES encryption to refresh the secret keys after a number of
blocks that is significantly smaller than 2keylength. Moreover, as discussed in 5.1, in the context of
embedded systems where trust in the environment around the encryptor cannot be guaranteed,
frequent key renewal can be beneficial (in addition to extra algorithmic and hardware security
layers) because there exist efficient attacks that can break AES after a limited number of rounds.
Finally, the most important justification to renew keys relatively often stems from the fact that,
beyond the algorithmic security of the encryption algorithm, key management and key storage
can be the main vulnerability in the security chain. In this perspective, renewing the keys often is
a way to reduce the negative impact of a key leakage.
4. Key agreement over a network of QKD links : QKD Networks
There are several fundamental limits regarding what can be achieved with standalone QKD
links. QKD links can by definition only operate over point-to-point connections between two users,
which greatly restricts the domain of applicability of quantum key distribution. Furthermore, QKD
links are limited in rate and distance, and cannot be deployed over any arbitrary network topology.
To overcome these limitations, it is important to study what can be achieved by networking QKD
links in order to extend the extremely high security standard offered by QKD to the context of long
distance communications betweenmultiple users. The development of QKD network architectures
appears from this perspective as a necessary step towards the effective integration of QKD into
secure data networks.
We will begin this section by an overview on the different generic QKD network architectures
that have already been proposed. We will then present some elements of comparison between
QKD networks and classical network, for the purpose of network-wide key agreement.
4.1. QKD network architectures
What we call a “quantum network” is an infrastructure composed of quantum links connecting
multiple distant nodes. A quantum network can be used for key agreement, relying for that on
QKD. We call such infrastructures “QKD networks”.
The essential functionality of the QKD network is to distribute unconditionally secure sym-
metric secret keys to any pair of legitimate users accessing the network. These first elements of
definition are however fairly generic and can be refined. Indeed, even though we are at the in-
fancy of the development of QKD networks, different models of QKD networks have already been
proposed.
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It is convenient to characterise the different QKD network models by the functionality that is
implemented within the nodes and thus by the different underlying quantum network models. We
can, from this perspective, differentiate three main categories of network concepts, based on dif-
ferent “families” of node functionalities: 1) optical switching; 2) quantum relaying; and 3) classical
trusted relaying.
Optically switched quantum networks. These are networks in which some optical function, like beam
splitting, switching, multiplexing, demultiplexing, etc., can be applied at the network nodes on the
quantum signals sent over the quantum channel. The purpose of such optical networking capabili-
ties in the context of QKD networks is that they allow to go beyond two-users QKD. One-to-many
connectivity between QKD devices was demonstrated over a passively switched optical network,
using the random splitting of single photons upon beam splitters [83]. Active optical switching
can also be used to allow the selective connection of any two QKD nodes with a direct quantum
channel. The BBN Darpa quantum network [76, 77] contains an active 2-by-2 optical switch in one
node, that can be used to actively switch between two network topologies. Optical functions can
thus be used to realise multi-user QKD and the corresponding nodes do not need to be trusted,
since quantum signals are transmitted over a quantum channel with no interruption from one end-
user QKD device to the other one. This QKD networkmodel can however not be used to extend the
distance over which keys can be distributed. Indeed, the extra amount of optical losses introduced
in the nodes will in reality shorten the maximum span of quantum channels.
“Full” quantum networks. To extend the distance on which quantum key distribution can be per-
formed, it is necessary to fight against propagation losses that affect the “quality” of the quantum
signals as they travel along the quantum channel. Quantum repeaters[84] can overcome the loss
problem and can be used to form an effective perfect quantum channel [85]. A quantum network
where nodes are constituted by quantum repeaters can thus be called a “full” quantum network. It
is not necessary to trust the network nodes to have unconditional security when performing QKD
over such full quantum networks.
Quantum repeaters however rely on elaborated quantum operations and on quantum memo-
ries that cannot be realised with current technologies. As discussed in [86], quantum nodes called
quantum relays could also be used to extend the reach of QKD. Quantum relays are simpler to
implement than quantum repeaters since they don’t require quantum memories. Building quan-
tum relays remains however technologically difficult and would not allow to extend QKD reach to
arbitrary long distances.
Trusted repeater QKD networks. This technique where trusted classical memories are placed within
the nodes can be implemented with today’s technology. Trusted repeater QKD networks operation
follow a simple principle: local keys are generated over QKD links and then stored in nodes that are
placed on both ends of each link. Global key agreement is performed over a QKD path, i.e. a one-
dimensional chain of trusted repeaters connected by QKD links, establishing a connection between
two end nodes, as shown on Fig. 2. Secret keys are forwarded, in a hop-by-hop fashion, along QKD
paths. To ensure secrecy, one-time-pad encryption and unconditionally secure authentication, both
realised with local QKD key, are performed. End-to-end information-theoretic security is thus
obtained between the end nodes provided the intermediate nodes can be trusted.
Node1 Node2 Node3 Node4 Node5
Figure 2: “Hop-by-hop” unconditionally secure message passing on a path made of trusted relay nodes connected by QKD
links. Message decryption / re-encryption is done at each intermediate node, by using one-time-pad between the local
key, distributed by QKD, Klocal, and the secret message M resulting in the ciphered message M
⊕
Klocal. Different key
associations are symbolised by different colours.
Classical trusted repeaters can be used to build a long-distance QKD network and real-scale
deployments of such QKD networks have already been demonstrated, firstly with the DARPA
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Quantum network, deployed in Boston in 2004 [76, 77] and more recently by the SECOQC consor-
tium that developed a highly integrated network architecture, with dedicated protocols, allowing
global key management [87, 88] and leading to a demonstration in 2008 in Vienna [61]. A trusted
repeater network is essentially a classical network where the exchanged data consists in keys en-
crypted with QKD-based keys. Since it relies on QKD for local secret key agreement and on un-
conditionally secure encryption, it can offer an unprecedented overall security for key agreement
and can accommodate long-distances. This last claim is of course only true if one can guarantee
that nodes can be trusted. Such assumptions is demanding but can be verified some existing high
security networks infrastructures. It can moreover be partially relaxed by making use of path di-
versity within networks, allowing to maintain security even when a limited number of nodes are
corrupted [89, 90].
4.2. Key agreement in a network: elements of comparison between classical key agreement schemes and
QKD networks
4.2.1. Key Establishment Rate
As discussed in 3.3.2, some security requirements related to current block ciphers such as AES
could motivate the need to refresh secret keys of such ciphers over times shorter than a minute.
Although this is possible in practice with current technology, relying on Diffie-Hellman and PKIs,
such key renewal rate policies are very seldom (if ever) enforced and the key renewal period of
most currently deployed VPNs is more in the range of hours. As a matter of fact, since public-
key cryptography is rather slow and computational intensive and is using long key modulus (see
details in 2.2), it could become an extremely high burden for end-users in terms of time and CPU
consumption if key renewal was to be done over times shorter than one minute. On the other hand,
despite the fact that QKD is very often portrayed as slow [7], QKD rates, as we have mentioned
earlier, are currently reaching several hundreds kbit/s for metropolitan distances. This implies that
QKD networks could typically allow to refresh thousands of 128-bits AES keys per second, over
VPN links in a metropolitan network.
4.2.2. Network initialization and key pre-distribution
Secure networks always rely on some initial trust in order to be able to provide some security
guarantee. As discussed in 2.4, a pair of initial small secrets or an authenticated classical chan-
nel is necessary to initialize a QKD link. We now consider the question of network initialization
and key pre-distribution for symmetric-key-based and asymmetric-key-based secure networks and
compare it with the requirements of QKD networks. As noted in [48], we can argue that the com-
bination of asymmetric-key (for key pre-distribution) and QKD presents some specific interests.
Key pre-distribution over networks relying on symmetric-key cryptography. One of the central issues in
network key distribution is the initialization and the management of a potentially very large pool
of secret keys: in a symmetric-key framework, where each member of an n-user network wants to
be able to communicate securely with each of the other n− 1 users, the key distribution scheme is
required to provide any of the n(n − 1)/2 pairs of users with a secret key before communication
can start. Managing the security of those keys efficiently is thus a difficult task as n grows. This
is the reason why large-scale symmetric-key cryptography is seldom used in today’s networks
(however some network security schemes, like the Kerberos network authentication scheme [91]
rely on classical symmetric-key cryptography and on a single trusted center).
Key pre-distribution over QKD networks. As pointed out in [7], QKD networks need pre-distributed
secret keys to perform the first rounds of authentication. The QKD-generated keys can then be
stored and used for later authentication. Initialization of a QKD network of n nodes thus a priori
requires the pre-distribution of n(n − 1)/2 pairs of secret keys (one per pair of user) with trusted
couriers. One can however take advantage of network connectivity to show that it is sufficient to
distribute keys over a subset of those n(n − 1)/2 pairs: what is needed is to distribute a pair of
keys over QKD links so that the resulting graph of “initialized” QKD links is a covering graph of
the QKD network. In this case, the complexity of key pre-distribution only scales linearly with the
network size.
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PKI Initialization. PKI is the most commonly employed system for key agreement over open net-
works. PKI trust relations are materialized by certificates, i.e. signatures of public-keys and these
trust relations can be organized hierarchically, which offers the advantage that trust relations do
not have to extend over all nodes in the network but only to a trusted third party called the certi-
fication authority. Public-key cryptography allows to perform secure key agreement between two
users without any pre-shared common secret: the only condition is that they accept to trust the
same certification authority. PKIs however also need to be initialized, which might require the use
of trusted couriers. In this sense, the initialization of a QKD network and the initialization of a PKI
are two problems that share some similarities.
Interest of PKIs for QKD Network Initialization. As pointed out in [7], QKD networks present a se-
curity advantage over PKIs when we consider the initialization phase: in order to threaten the
security of a QKD network, message authentication needs to be broken before or during the exe-
cution of the quantum key establishment protocol. This property is connected to the everlasting
security of QKD explained in 2.4.
One can take advantage of this property in the case of QKD network initialization and con-
sider an hybrid scenario for key pre-distribution in which the classical communications needed for
the key distillation phase are authenticated, at least during the first QKD sessions, by a computa-
tionally secure message authentication scheme based on public-key cryptography (for which the
PKI has been freshly initialized). If no active attack on authentication has been performed before
the first potentially vulnerable (assuming some potential weaknesses of asymmetric cryptography)
QKD sessions, then the keys shared by Alice and Bob are identical and unconditionally secure. The
previous condition will always be verified if the computational power of the adversary is bounded
at the time of the QKD network initialization which constitutes a moderate assumption. There is a
clear practical interest for such a scheme: it relaxes the requirement of distributing pre-established
small keys in a QKD network for each network initialization (which requires secret couriers and
can be a difficult key management problem in the case of large networks).
4.2.3. Vulnerability against denial-of-service attacks
As discussed in 2.4, an individual QKD link is vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that
can be brutally realized by physically cutting the quantum channel, or, more subtly, by acting on
the quantum channel in order to increase the noise above the security threshold, so that no key can
be generated despite the availability of the QKD link.
As we are interested here in comparing classical or quantum networks, it is important to note
that the vulnerability to DoS attacks targeting individual communication lines, exists in both cases.
There is an important difference: physical signals in classical networks can be broadcast, while
QKD optical signals sent on the quantum channel can’t, as this would violate the no-cloning theo-
rem. Broadcasting the same quantum signals over multiple channels can thus not be used in QKD
networks to resist against DoS attacks on some channels.
On the other hand, XORing keys obtained via key agreements realized over disjoint paths (con-
necting the same endpoints) is a solution that can be used both in a classical and in a quantum
context and that can be employed to perform reliable classical communication against an oppo-
nent performing DoS attacks on a limited number of paths. In this case, the resilience against DoS
attacks, characterized by the maximum number of coordinated attacks that can be tolerated (while
still being able to perform key agreement), depends on the topology of the network.
There is another important aspect to consider: since the classical communications in a QKD
protocol require the use of keys for authentication, DoS attacks can be designed to exhaust the key
reservoirs on Alice and Bob and thus make the QKD link unusable to generate more key, unless
it is reinitialized with small authentication keys. In a network context, there are however several
solutions to key exhaustion: path diversity can be used, as explained above, and if there exists one
functional path in the QKD network connecting the two endpoints of the link, this path can then be
used to rekey the link. Moreover, besides the obvious but costly solution of using trusted courier to
rekeying exhausted key store, one could also use the hybrid solution mentioned above, i.e. using a
PKI for the first authentication round.
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4.3. Open networks versus trusted QKD networks
As pointed out in [12], “quantum cryptology is not a solution for open networks”, i.e. a QKD
network does not allow users that do not share any pre-established secrets or trust relations to
exchange a key and then communicate securely. In a sense QKD networks are also tied by their
“physical nature”: they are limited in distance since quantum signals are exchanged over lossy
optical channels. These physical limitations however bring a considerable security advantage:
QKD networks can provide unconditional security to all the users that have access rights to the
network and are thus inside the “circle of trust” of these closed networks. As we shall discuss in
5.4, the practicality of asymmetric cryptography and its suitability for open networks may have as
a counterpart the existence of stronger vulnerabilities to cryptanalysis.
The difference between quantum networks and classical networks thus appears to be almost
ontological : they do not offer the same services and exhibit a relation with space and distance
that is extremely different. While classical open networks, and especially the Internet have been
described as “small worlds”, where physical signals can be regenerated, data can be copied and
distances are almost abolished, quantum networks are in essence closed networks where distance
comes back into the game, as it is the case with telephone networks [92].
5. Challenges and future directions
As shown by the discussions we have conducted in sections 3 and 4, QKD is essentially adapted
to be used in combination with classical cryptographic techniques. To move forward towards
larger adoption, several factorswill play an important role, in particular QKD system performances
(in terms of key rate or reachable distance), their security, as well their integrability into modern
optical networks. Since this paper focuses on the cryptographic status of QKD, we will essentially
concentrate on challenges related to the practical security of QKD, and will evoke some research
topics where the interplay between classical and quantum cryptography is likely to open interest-
ing new perspectives.
5.1. Practical security of QKD implementations and implementation loopholes
5.1.1. Physical side-channels
Instead of trying to break the theoretical foundations of a given cryptographic system, another
“attack philosophy” is to attack its implementation via loopholes, in order to gain some secret infor-
mation via unconventional channels such as electromagnetic radiation, heat dissipation, acoustic
noise, observation of computation time or power consumption.
As first demonstrated in the pioneering work of P. Kocher at the end of the 1990’s, one can
exploit so-called “physical side-channels” throughwhich information about secret keys leaks while
cryptographic computations are being conducted to mount extremely powerful attacks. The first
efficient attacks to be demonstrated were based on monitoring the execution time and then the
power consumption of classical cryptographic devices (whose implementations ultimately rely on
semiconductor logic gates and transistors) [93, 94]. The variety of side-channel attacks and of
counter-measures has gradually expanded since then and one can for example consult the ECRYPT
Side Channel Cryptanalysis Lounge for a thorough overview [95].
The threats imposed by side-channel attacks can be in practice extremely serious. Their study
and the development of countermeasures has thus become an increasingly important topic, in par-
ticular in the context of embedded cryptographic systems evolving in potentially hostile environ-
ments, such as smart cards. If we consider for example the vulnerabilities of AES to side-channel
attacks, state-of-the-art DPA attacks (Differential Power Analysis attacks, i.e. passive attacks per-
formed by monitoring the power consumption of the device) can successfully break unprotected
AES implementations on a smart card after the acquisition of 100 power traces, while roughly 50000
power traces are needed to break software protected implementations of AES. Even protected im-
plementations of AES can thus be broken in a few minutes with DPA[96]. Moreover, if one allows
active attacks, such as attacks based on fault injection in the circuit, then a full break of AES128 has
been obtained in a few seconds, with only 2 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertext [97]. Note also
that implementation of asymmetric cryptographic schemes, such as RSA, are also vulnerable to
side-channels attacks [98]. To increase security, dedicated counter-measure need to be deployed, as
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well as extra layers of hardware protections (in order to physically restrict the possibility to launch
such attacks).
As we shall explain in more details in the next paragraph, QKD is not immune to side-channels
attacks and it has already been demonstrated that some specific implementation imperfections in
QKD systems can also be exploited to mount side-channel attacks.
5.1.2. Quantum hacking
As explained in 2.4, some trust assumptions are always needed to prove the security of a QKD
protocol. In particular, Alice and Bob’s hardware is assumed to be in secure labs (the [Secure labs]
assumptions) and its operation is supposed to conform to what Alice and Bob expect ([Trustwor-
thy Implementation]). When one deals with real QKD implementations, both of these assump-
tions, and thus the entire security proof can however be challenged if some imperfections can be
exploited to mount side-channel attacks. This line of research, called quantum hacking has become
an important research field during the past years, where different types of attacks on QKD im-
plementations have been proposed and experimentally demonstrated. After tackling the general
question of the categorization of (passive or active) attacks on QKD systems, we will briefly review
the main side-channel attacks studied so far and comment on the general situation of QKD with
respect to practical security.
Passive and active side-channel attacks in QKD. By analogywith the attacks on classical cryptographic
systems, it is interesting to distinguish between passive and active side-channel attacks in QKD.
This categorization is not straightforward since, unlike in the classical case, “passive listening” on
a quantum signal creates disturbances. This leads to the question of whether the concept of passive
side-channel attack is meaningful in QKD. However, since disturbances due to eavesdropping on a
quantum signal are taken into account by security proofs, the corresponding attacks should not be
considered side-channel attacks. We can, on the other hand, define side-channel attacks as attacks
exploiting discrepancies between the security proof framework and the actual characteristics of the
implementation.
• Passive side-channel attacks correspond to attacks where the attacker does not actively mod-
ify the characteristics of the implementation, and tries to exploit existing imperfections to
break the security. This can for example be possible if some information leaks from Alice’s
lab, as in the very first QKD experiment performed in 1989 [99], where the Pockels cells used
to modulate the polarization on Alice’s side made noises indicating the state sent by Alice.
This lead Charles Bennett to notice that the QKD system was only secure against an eaves-
dropper who happened to be deaf.
• Active side-channel attacks correspond to attacks where the opponent actively modify some
characteristics of the implementation in order create an exploitable deviation between the
way the system under attack operates and the assumptions in the security proof. Most of
the attacks evoked in the remaining part of this paragraph such as blinding attack and Trojan
horse attacks are active side-channel attacks.
Review of the main side-channel attacks.
• “Conventional” side-channels. Most side-channels studied so far in the QKD research literature
are “quantum-specific loopholes”. This focus is natural since the main difference between
QKD links and classical cryptosystems stems from the fact that the quantum channel is fully
under the active control of Eve, leading to specific security issues. However, “conventional”
side-channels, i.e. security loopholes related to non-quantum aspects of the QKD protocol
are also a serious threat. The accumulated knowledge from classical cryptography, regarding
the secure design of cryptographic hardware will thus be extremely precious in this domain.
One important class of conventional side-channels are the covert channels leaking informa-
tion about the internal state of Alice or Bob’s QKD hardware, for example via acoustic or
electromagnetic radiations. The TEMPEST [100] measurement standards, dedicated to en-
sure protection requirement of cryptographic hardware against compromising emissions, are
therefore meaningful in order to enforce the cryptographic boundary around Alice and Bob’s
QKD devices ([Secure lab] assumption).
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• Trojan horse attacks. Trojan horse attacks on QKD implementations [101] consist in sending
Alice or Bob, via the quantum channel, intense pulses of light that will reflect back on the
optical elements. By monitoring the reflected light, information about the internal state of
QKD devices can be learned by an eavesdropper. In particular, information about the status
of the Alice’s modulators (phase of polarization) can be learned and thus information about
the key. Counter-measure against Trojan horse attacks can consist in putting spectral filters
on Alice and Bob’s side, as well as an optical isolator on Alice’s side, and also to actively
monitor the incoming light in Alice and Bob’s devices.
• Attacks on single photon detectors. Single photon detectors, usually avalanche photodiodes
(APDs) operated in trigger mode are one of the key elements in discrete-variable QKD im-
plementations. Many of the published attacks have been realized by exploiting existing or
induced imperfections of APDs. In the detector blinding attack [102, 49], an intense pulse of
light is used to change the detector response characteristics, allowing then to use faked-states
sent by Eve to mimic a correct behavior [103, 104] (with respect to the observation of correct
detection statistics as well as correct correlations between Alice and Bob’s measurements)
while breaking the security of the QKD protocol since the detector response is manipulated
by Eve. Many implementations rely on several APDs (for example one per detection basis
in BB84) and a lack of symmetry between the detectors can be exploited to launch attacks.
A temporal efficiency mismatch between two APDs can for example be used by the eaves-
dropper to launch the so-called time-shift attack: by adding a random temporal delay to the
pulse, the eavesdropper can obtain information about which detector has clicked and thus
about the key [105, 106]. A countermeasure against the time-shift attack is to bring back the
symmetry by performing a 4-state modulation (instead of 2-state) on Bob side [107].
• Side-channel on random number generators. If Eve is able to learn some information about the
randomness generated by Alice and Bob to run the QKD protocol, this could lead to a com-
plete security breach. As already discussed in 2.4, true number generators (TRNGs), whose
entropy is intrinsically based on quantum processes should be used in QKD implementa-
tions, however a classical cryptographic processing of the output of the generator is useful
to guarantee the robustness of the TRNG against some external physical biases. In addition,
TEMPEST protection should also be applied to the QRNGs.
• Attacks on calibration procedures. In a practical QKD system, some important parameterswhich
play a role in the security of the system (for example the intensity of the laser source, the
length of the quantum channel or the timing of the gate for single-photon detectors), are not
directly measured during the “quantum phase” of the QKD protocol, but are calibrated. It
means they are measured offline: possibly once for all in the factory; or regularly if this pa-
rameter can fluctuate (this for example is the case for the gate delay in the Clavis2 implemen-
tation of BB84 by IdQuantique). The calibration protocols used to measure such parameters
are thus important for security and it has recently been demonstrated that attacking the cal-
ibration of a QKD system can lead to security breaches [50]. Calibration protocols in QKD
must thus be considered in an adversarial setting. It is also true in the case of continuous-
variable QKD, for parameters such as shot-noise measurements, that may be altered if the
eavesdropper is left free to actively manipulate the local oscillator [108].
• Attacks on multi-photon pulses - Extended security models. In the BB84 protocol and other discrete-
variable protocols, many among the early security proofs [35, 34, 36] assumed that Alice
sends single-photon pulses. However, single photon sources are experimentally challenging
to make and thus impractical to use in real QKD systems. Instead, weak coherent laser pulses
(WCP) with poissonian photon statistics are used. This has security implications since pulses
of light containing more than one photon can be exploited by the eavesdropper to learn po-
tentially all the information about the encoded bit, using the so-called photon-number-splitting
(PNS) attack [43]. Considering this attack, it remains possible to prove the security of BB84
performed with WCP, but one must decrease the mean number of photons in the pulse (and
hence the rate) as the distance increases [43]. In 2003, a more radical response to the PNS
attack has been proposed, that consists in modifying the QKD protocol with the adjunction
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of decoy-states to actively test the influence of the eavesdropper on the photon statistics.
This protocols allows to obtain a linear decrease of key rate with distance, which is optimal
[109, 110].
More generally, it has been shown that small deviations between the model and the imple-
mentation, such as imperfect preparation of the states by Alice or imperfect detection by Bob,
can essentially be captured in the security model, at the expense of some extra privacy am-
plification [111]. Note that is not the case for attacks like blinding or Trojan horse, where the
deviation from the security model is not small.
5.2. Device-independent security: fundamental quantum mechanics as a tool against side-channels
Device-independent security [112] is a promising development of quantum cryptography, with
no classical counterpart. It allows to perform cryptographic tasks, with unconditional security,
without assuming that the underlying hardware implementation is trusted. Device-independent
security is based on the non-locality of entangled quantum states. Moreover the non-local corre-
lations involved in Bell Inequalities (BI) violation, reachable with an entangled quantum state [2],
can be related to the absence of side-channels: one can test and verify that the Hilbert space in which
the quantum state of the system is controlled and observed is not leaking information towards an-
other Hilbert space and thus to a potential eavesdropper [113]. As shown in Ref. [112] it is possible
to build so-called device-independent QKD protocols that are intrinsically resistant to side-channel
attacks. However, for device-independent security proofs to be valid, BI violations must be tested
in the so-called loophole-free regime, which remains currently an experimental challenge. As a
consequence, practical long-distance device-independent QKD seems out of reach for the moment
(but is significantly easier than large scale quantum computing).
It is in essence impossible to prove such side-channel-resistance properties with classical cryp-
tographic systems, because any classical message can be duplicated and cloned without any per-
turbation. It is fascinating to notice that some very deep aspects of quantum information tools, like
the loophole-free Bell Inequalities testing [114], that happen to be at the heart of quantum theory
foundations, are seemingly bound to play an important role in the future development of secure
cryptographic hardware.
5.3. Cryptographic certification of quantum cryptosystems
One aspect that may strongly hinder the adoption of QKD in network security has been spot-
ted a long time ago by Michael Nielsen [115]: quantum cryptosystems are currently lacking one
important element: historical security. The confidence in a cryptosystem indeed not only stems
from the fundamental principles of its security, but also from the fact that it has been intensively
tested, attacked and verified by a large number of experts and users. It is clear that current QKD
implementation cannot claim a large historical security, since few commercial systems are avail-
able and only few teams around the world have tried to attack the potential weaknesses of QKD
systems. However, as explained in 5.1 the work on quantum hacking as well as the development
of counter-measure is gaining a lot of momentum, thus improving the situation.
In parallel to this necessary scientific research on practical security, the emergence of security
standards and certification procedures for QKD device will be a necessary step to build a security
referential against which systems can be tested. This work, which had started within the SECOQC
project [116], is now lead within a dedicated working group ETSI, the European Telecommunica-
tions Standards Institute. The QKD ISG, industry standardization group, launched in October
2008, brings together important actors from science and industry in order to converge towards in-
dustry standards for QKD, including standards concerning the cryptographic certification of QKD
hardware implementations.
5.4. Post-quantum computing cryptography
As noted in [12], “If powerful quantum computers could be built, most asymmetric crypto-
graphic protocols in use todaywould no longer be secure, which would present a serious challenge
for open networks”. As also noted in [12] and explained in 4.3, QKD cannot constitute a solution
for open networks either, however the potential impact of quantum computation on cryptography
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is motivating collaboration between the quantum information and the cryptography community,
with an impact on the development of both fields.
Beyond the classical ITS key establishment schemes discussed in 2.1, the fast-growing knowl-
edge accumulated on quantum computation must be taken into account when designing new
public-key schemes and study their resilience to quantum computing attacks. An important topic
is thus to find computational problems that would be difficult on a quantum computer, and on
which public-key schemes could be based. The lattice shortest-vector problem [22] on which the
NTRU public-key scheme is built or the McEliece public-key encryption system, based on coding
theory [117], both fall in this category of (likely) quantum-resistant public-key cryptosystems.
Such QC-resistant public-key schemes probably constitute the most plausible solutions to re-
place the current asymmetric schemes, if large quantum computers were made, or if problems
such as factoring or discrete logarithm extraction were to be broken. However, public-key schemes
like McEliece is significantly less efficient, in terms of key sizes, than current public-key schemes
while the security of NTRU is still not consideredwell established. It is also important to notice that
even though there exists no known quantum algorithm able to attack efficiently NTRU or McEliece
public-key schemes, none of them are proven to be difficult problems (of super-polynomial com-
plexity) on a quantum computer (indeed there is no proof that they are difficult on a classical com-
puter). On one hand, the lattice shortest-vector problem, which is NP-hard on a classical computer,
seems to be of a comparable complexity on quantum computer [23, 24] which is an indication that
quantum computers could not solve this problem efficiently. On the other hand, the fact that NTRU
is based on the shortest-vector problem (SVP) does not imply that the only way to break NTRU is
to solve SVP.
Indeed, as noted in [118], the question of whether the complexity classes related to mathemati-
cal problems are ultimately different on a quantum computer thanwhat they are classically remains
essentially an open question. There are even some indications leading to partially negatively an-
swer to this question: as demonstrated in [119], oracle methods can be used to give evidence that
the complexity class NP is not included in BQP (which contains the problems that can be consid-
ered as efficiently solvable on a quantum computer), somehow setting a limit to the power of a
quantum computer.
Understanding algorithmic security in a world where large-scale quantum computers may ex-
ist one day implies to take a fresh look on cryptographic designs and is connected to fundamental
questions in computational complexity. Post-quantum cryptography is thus an extremely impor-
tant and stimulating research field, not only for the cryptography of tomorrow, but also for the
cryptography of today.
5.5. Classical Cryptographic Primitives built on top of QKD networks
QKD networks operated with trusted repeaters can be deployed today and can therefore be
considered as a new security infrastructure. We believe that it could be fruitful to also consider
such networks from a purely theoretical point of view, as “new cryptographic primitives”, allowing
the establishment of unconditionally secure keys, among a network of trusted centers connected
by QKD links.
It seems interesting to examine what new classical cryptographic protocols could be built on
top of such networks, beyond global pair-wise key establishment. As already proposed in [120] in
the framework of the bounded quantum-storage model [121], QKD networks could be combined
with Oblivious Transfer in order to allow unconditionally secure multi-party computations. One
can also study the efficiency of secret sharing schemes over such new cryptographic infrastructure.
Important work has already been done on that topic (totally independently fromQKD networks
considerations) [122, 123, 124, 125]. This work strikingly fits with the unconditional security offered
by QKD networks, and powerful information-theoretic tools have been developed to guarantee the
security of such networks evenwhen some fraction of the network nodes are corrupted. We believe
that this opens promising research perspectives in the domain of unconditionally secure networks.
6. Conclusion
QKD is currently the only known cryptographic technique that has lead to secret key agreement
protocols for which the unconditional security can be formally established. Since the first QKD
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protocol, BB84, proposed 25 years ago [32], prolific theoretical and experimental research work
has been conducted, as illustrated by our survey mostly centered on European realizations. Quan-
tum cryptography has rapidly become an established academic topic within quantum information
science, while QKD technologies have continuously moved forward in terms of performance and
reliability.
The acknowledgement of these advances by security experts and by leading classical cryptog-
raphers is likely to play a key role in the development dynamics of a QKD industry and cannot be
taken for granted. The main objective of this article was thus to give an overview of the develop-
ment of QKD, as a cryptographic technology, with an emphasis on practical scenarios such as its
use for key renewal in order to realize link encryption and its deployment at a network scale. The
general message is that the most interesting uses arise when the long-term confidentiality of QKD-
established keys can be exploited to provide some security advantage that could not be attained
otherwise. This is in particular the case when QKD is combined with one-time-pad encryption,
while it could also be the case when QKD is combined with AES. Concerning its deployment in a
network context, the rationale for the use of QKD is to focus on medium-sized operated (closed)
networks and also to carefullymanage the established keys aswell as the authentication procedure.
One interesting feature is that, when combined with public-key infrastructures, used for initial au-
thentication, the use of QKD networks then provides long-term security of the established keys.
Concerning future developments of QKD, we believe that it can benefit from cross-disciplinary
approaches on fundamental topics such as the construction of ITS network protocols or the study
of side-channels in cryptographic hardware. Synergies with network security research andwith in-
dustry are likely to play an increasing role as certification procedures for QKD devices are adopted
and products tested on real-world networks. We believe that the search of long-term security
should be the driving concern when integrating QKD into security infrastructures.
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